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Implicit Discount Rates and the Purchase 
of Untried, Energy-Saving Durable Goods 
DOUGLAS A. HOUSTON* 
Many consumers appear to rationally calculate the net worth of a household in-
vestment, but a substantial minority may lack the skills or alertness to perceive 
an investment opportunity and initiate analysis. Intentions to engage in comple-
mentary activities play an important role in the investment decision. 
W hy do some consumers require 50 percent or greater returns on household inves tments? W h y do other 
consumers reject investments yielding 50 percent or greater 
returns? Based on empirical analyses of consumer invest-
ments in energy-us ing durab le goods , some economis t s 
have argued that consumers become confused and hesitant 
when monetary paybacks stretch over many years; they may 
be unable to choose rationally among investment options. 
Gately (1980) found that extremely high discount rates were 
applied by consumers in the purchase of an energy-using 
durable. Hausman (1979) estimated that very high implicit 
d i scount rates were used by lower income c o n s u m e r s . 
Hausman argued that lower income consumers were less 
educated and may have suffered (relative to more educated 
individuals) from a defective 4 ' te lescopic fac i l i ty"—an in-
ability to measure correctly the net worth of investments in 
durables. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the factors which 
influence a household 's investment in an untried, energy-
saving durable good. At one level , we seek to test the 
hypothes i s that a household inves tment dec is ion is ra-
t ional—that is, based upon an analysis of expected costs 
and returns for an entire investment program. It would be 
proper in a rational investment analysis to include all ex-
pected, user-borne costs of initial planning, purchase, use , 
and resale or disposal. These costs (hereafter termed pro-
gram costs) are frequently ignored in empirical analyses, 
but if program costs vary substantially across the investing 
household population, we should observe systematic, pos-
itive variations between individual discount rates and these 
additional costs. Higher discount rates would reduce the 
likelihood of investment. Because program costs are not 
directly observable, proxies are used in this study. For ex-
a m p l e , an index of pr ior exper i ence with ene rgy-sav ing 
activities and an index of intentions to engage in energy-
saving activities are employed in regression analysis; both 
*Douglas A. Houston is Assistant Professor of Business Economics, 
School of Business, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045. He 
thanks Bruce Jaffee for helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper. 
are considered to be related to particular aspects of expected 
costs. Other explanatory variables considered are: house-
hold income, number of individuals in the family, housing 
type, housing age , and household square footage. 
At another level , persistent errors in judgment may be 
a significant factor in the behavior of many potential inves-
tors, as Hausman sugges t s—tha t is , a clear perception of 
investment opportuni ty may be lacking in some respondents 
(Kirzner 1973). These households may, more frequently 
than others , refuse to consider inves tments , in spite of the 
size of the r e tu rn . A s e c o n d pu rpose of the study is to 
analyze the d i f ferences in charac te r i s t i c s be tween unre-
sponsive households and those that perceived more clearly 
an opportunity to invest . 
T h e empi r i ca l i nves t iga t ion is based o n data acquired 
from a ma i l survey of app rox ima te ly 3 , 0 0 0 households. 
Data were obtained on various aspects of energy use and 
a number of demographic characteristics of the households. 
Households also responded to a hypothetical question of 
the necessary annual cost savings required to cause them 
to purchase an energy-saving durable good with unspecified 
characteristics. Initial purchase and installation price for the 
long-lived device were given to the respondents . By use of 
qualitative choice mode l s , w e examined (1) the relationship 
be tween a set of e x p l a n a t o r y var iables and the minimal 
accep tab le re tu rn on the i nves tmen t , and (2) the factors 
which influence a respondent to avoid considering an in-
vestment proposal , regardless of potential return. 
A number of caveats are in order. First, for the purpose 
of this p a p e r , w e fo l low B e c k e r ' s (1965) model of the 
household as a single economic unit with shared consump-
tion and product ion. Whi le criticisms of the " n e w home 
e c o n o m i c s " abound (Ferber and Birnbaum 1977; Lancaster 
1975; Willis 1973), this paper focuses on the issue of the 
investment decision of the household as a singular decision-
making unit . T o the extent that a household utility function 
is inappropriate, the results of this paper should be tempered 
by judgment . Second, the study does not contain all eco-
nomic and demograph ic variables likely t o affect the in-
vestment decision, and does not contain psychological in-
formation about respondents . For these reasons, as well as 
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the possibility of s o m e nonra t ional behavior , there is con-
s iderable unexplained var iance in the es t imat ions . Third , 
the investment p roposa l is hypothe t ica l , so we cannot be 
confident that responses w o u l d be identical for an actual 
investment . Last , the paper does not a t tempt to explain the 
c o m p l e x decision process by wh ich the investment is ana-
l y z e d . Therefore, w e cannot de te rmine how the investment 
d e c i s i o n is reached, but can on ly provide some evidence 
a b o u t the economic rat ionali ty of that decis ion process . 
T H E INVESTMENT DECISION MODEL 
Framework of the Problem 
T h e respondents in our s tudy considered the fol lowing 
q u e s t i o n : 1 
I f an energy-saving device, with a very long useful life, could 
b e purchased and installed in your home for $ 1 0 0 , approxi-
mately how much would you have to save in energy costs 
e a c h year before you would install the device? 
R e s p o n d e n t s were g iven seven response opt ions: (1) less 
than $ 1 0 per year; (2) $ 1 0 - $ 2 0 pe r year; (3) $ 2 1 - $ 3 0 per 
yea r ; ( 4 ) $31 -$40 per year; (5) $ 4 1 - $ 5 0 per year; (6) more 
than $ 5 0 per year; and (7) d o n ' t k n o w or uncer ta in . 
F a c e d with such a cos t -saving inves tment choice , many 
c o n s u m e r s were unc lear about h o w to proceed. Qui te l ikely, 
s i m p l e rules of t h u m b were app l i ed to the p rob lem. In se-
l e c t i n g a particular return (or choos ing not to respond) , the 
d e c i s i o n , to be ra t ional , mus t incorpora te information about 
e x p e c t e d costs a n d r e t u r n s . In t e x t b o o k e x a m p l e s of in-
v e s t m e n t analysis, the cos t s , r e tu rns , and degree of uncer-
t a in ty a r e generally t reated as a m a n a g e a b l e , mathemat ica l 
e x e r c i s e . On the surface , the ques t ion posed about the en-
e r g y - s a v i n g device m a y appear to be easily approached by 
a m a t h e m a t i c a l , cost-benefi t , p resen t -va lue analys is . Given 
that f r a m e w o r k , the choice va r i ab le then is the net implicit 
d i s c o u n t rate. 
W e hypo thes i ze that the informat ion provided to the con-
s u m e r i n the inves tment ques t ion is insufficient to allow a 
c o m p l e t e analysis, even though the quest ion clearly states 
a n n u a l i z e d cost s a v i n g s . F i r s t , e a c h c o n s u m e r , p r io r t o 
c o m m i t t i n g to an inves tmen t , h a s an unders tanding of his 
or h e r skillfulness and k n o w l e d g e in under taking the in-
v e s t m e n t program. T h e use r -bo rne p rogram cos t s—cos t of 
a n a l y s i s , cost of househo ld labor in implementa t ion , and 
cos t s a s s o c i a t e d with resale or d i sposa l—shou ld be consid-
e red b y the rational inves tor ; these program costs wil l , in 
g e n e r a l , vary a m o n g h o u s e h o l d s . Second , the dev ice ' s po-
t en t i a l c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y (or subst i tutabi l i ty) with exist ing 
h o u s e h o l d energy s tocks m a y al ter the value of the device 
and t h e chosen d i scount ra te . T h e s e factors would be esti-
m a t e d b y the r a t iona l i n v e s t o r a n d inc luded in the cos t -
benef i t a n a l y s i s . 
F o r t h e energy-saving i nves tmen t proposal investigated 
' R e s p o n d e n t s are individual households in southern and central Indiana. 
The d e t a i l s of the data collection method, selection of respondents, and 
charac ter i s t ics of the sample are presented later in the paper. 
in this paper , the various expected costs and values through 
t ime (both monetary and nonpecuniary) can be summarized 
in the choice by the consumer of a minimally acceptable 
annual ized monetary cost savings. That choice implies the 
exis tence of a gross discount rate (GDR) used in the deci-
s ion. T h e term " g r o s s " is employed to emphasize that the 
return selected by respondents may be based on a number 
of addit ional p rogram costs and savings beyond those stated 
on the quest ionnaire . 
Interpretation of the Response 
to the Investment Question 
Because the hypothetical investment question resulted in 
n o ac tua l cos t s o r r eward to the r e sponden t , a potent ia l 
p rob lem arises in interpretation of the gross discount rate 
responses . Are w e examining the decision that would be 
m a d e in real life? A judgment is necessarily speculative. 
Whi le the study could have been performed for actual rather 
than hypothetical investment behavior, there are two major 
problems with the former approach. First, the model de-
veloped in this paper requires detailed information about 
households that rarely can be obtained for households that 
have all considered the same investment. Second, it is the 
expected cost savings that are important to the investment 
decision rather than realized savings. The study uses the 
hypothet ical question to achieve the notion of expected con-
d i t i ons , bu t it m a y not b e fully representa t ive of ac tua l 
investment behavior , since no monetary penalty or reward 
results from the decision. 
There is evidence that many respondents answered care-
fully. At the end of the completed survey, in space provided 
for c o m m e n t s , many individuals indicated their concerns 
abou t the survey i nves tmen t ques t ion . S o m e added as-
sumpt ions , such as the high probability that their household 
cou ld not ach ieve the s tated savings due to current low 
energy usage . Many expressed skepticism that any energy 
device truly achieves its stated cost savings after all cost 
factors are cons ide red . 2 Such comments suggest that many 
respondents did not take the explicit cost-saving statement 
as the comple te picture. Instead, they may have modified 
their investment analysis according to individual percep-
tions of o ther expected program costs and savings. 
A few consumers seemed to believe that the investment 
would in some way lead to loss of a currently useful house-
ho ld d u r a b l e — i . e . , that the energy-sav ing device w a s a 
replacement rather than an add-on item. Such an interpre-
tation was not intended by the survey team. Under replace-
ment condi t ions , a rational investor would reduce the net 
present value obtained from the new investment by the re-
maining present value of returns from the existing durable 
to be r e p l a c e d , less any sc rap va lue . T o the extent that 
Skepticism about payoffs from household energy investments may be 
a reasonable response, if prior information tended to be overly optimistic 
about expected savings. For example, the effect of installing ceiling in-
sulation on energy usage has tended to be overestimated by both marketers 
and government agencies. See Consumer Reports (1978). 
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respondents interpreted the investment as a replacement 
rather than as a new durable, the required return on in-
vestment and the observed implicit discount rate were in-
creased. 
Some respondents indicated confusion about how to pro-
ceed in determining the "appropr ia te" response. Others 
indicated that insufficient information was provided to al-
low an answer they could support. These and other respon-
dents who offered no explanation of how they answered 
may have been perplexed by the question. Confusing con-
ditions are generally present (often in much greater degree) 
in a consumer's purchase decision about any untried durable 
good. Clearly, more precise and extensive information 
would have made the task easier, but it also would have 
altered an important, interesting aspect of the investment 
problem. Many consumers, facing an unusual investment 
proposal, may lack the alertness to conceptualize clearly 
the costs and benefits. These confused respondents affect 
our analysis in two ways. First, many individuals (approx-
imately one-third of the sample) responded to the invest-
ment proposal with "don ' t know or uncer ta in . " Second, 
the nonrational selection of positive returns by confused 
individuals is reflected in the weakening of the economic 
model of implicit discount rate, reducing its explanatory 
power. 
A flow chart of the decision process is shown in the 
Figure. We expect respondents who have the alertness and 
analytic ability to select a posit ive savings necessary to 
induce investment. In general, these individuals rationally 
augment the questionnaire's statement of costs and savings 
with other user-borne program costs prior to deciding on 
a necessary return. Although it is possible for a rational 
individual to select a " d o n ' t know or uncer ta in" response, 
the ability to select the highest return (open-ended upward) 
should provide an appropriate response for individuals who 
are highly uncertain about costs or expect to bear high pro-
gram costs . 3 The response of " d o n ' t know or uncer ta in" 
is generally nonrational. Many individuals selecting it lack 
a decision rule (rule of thumb) to guide them in compre-
hending the data. Unfortunately, some of these individuals 
may simply randomly select a positive return, thus weak-
ening the linkage of explanatory factors to the discount rate 
in estimation. 
We treated the two groups (positive response or " d o n ' t 
k n o w " response) separately in empirical analyses. Those 
answering with a posit ive savings requ i rement were ex -
amined in a tobit regression model of the d iscount ra te 
level. " D o n ' t know or uncertain" answers were examined 
in a probit regression of the choice be tween the " d o n ' t 
k n o w " versus a positive return response. 
3Some "don't know or uncertain*' responses, however, can be econom-
ically rational. If a respondent expects that the cost of trying to understand 
the question sufficiently well to answer thoughtfully is greater than the 
value of that effort, he may rationally choose a "don' t know or uncertain" 
answer. Yet many who would fit into this category may have applied a 
similar logic to the entire questionnaire and are therefore nonrespondents. 
DATA SOURCE 
All information used in the estimations was taken f r o m 
a mai l survey of individual househo lds . Approximately 
3 ,000 residential households serviced by 18 rural electric 
membersh ip cooperatives (REMCs) in southern and central 
Indiana were surveyed. The sample was selected from the 
r e c o r d s of the coopera t ives by a random sampling tech-
n ique . To focus upon residential customers having similar 
oppor tun i t i e s to apply an energy-sav ing device to their 
household operat ions, those households that were engaged 
in farming, that did not own their dwelling, or that lived 
in the unit for only part of the year were eliminated f rom 
t he analysis. Census data for housing, population, and in-
c o m e were used to compare the respondents with the re-
gional populat ion. The respondents were found to be rep-
resentat ive. 
The questionnaire included 35 items related to various 
aspects of energy consumption in the home, appliance o w n -
ership and use , measures of past and intended energy c o n -
servation measures , selected demographic characteristics of 
the household, and an energy-saving investment proposal. 
T h e questionnaire was mailed in the summer of 1979 and 
was returned, fully completed, by 83 percent of the house-
holds . 
The high response rate was obtained without followup 
contact after the initial mail ing. Individual users own the 
cooperat ives and therefore may have felt a commitment to 
respond to the survey. Prior to the mailing of the survey, 
the genera l m a n a g e r of each coopera t ive sent a letter t o 
each selected household in his or he r cooperative requesting 
assistance and stressing the importance of the survey to the 
cooperat ive. Enclosed with each mailed survey was a dollar 
bill that the recipient was told to k e e p , regardless of whether 
the 35-question survey was completed. At a minimum, the 
dollar bill may have prompted a fairly quick response. In-
terestingly, many people who did not complete the ques-
t ionnaire returned the dollar bill. 
Restricting the study to households occupied for the full 
year and households without significant farm-related oper-
a t ions r educed the n u m b e r of observat ions to 1,081. O f 
t h e s e , 725 r e s p o n d e d to the inves tment question with a 
posi t ive return and 356 answered " d o n ' t know or uncer-
t a i n . " 
There are clearly some prob lems of measurement with 
respect to household square footage, annual income, and 
the listing of past and intended conservation efforts. For 
example , individuals usually have an imprecise notion o f 
the heated square footage in their homes. These problems 
are largely a shortcoming of the survey form of information 
gathering. 
THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
Tobit Regression Analysis 
Based on pos i t i ve sav ing r e sponses to the investment 
quest ion, a gross implicit d iscount rate (GDR) was calcu-
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lated for each respondent . The discount rates are directly 
calculated on the assumption that the returns per year are 
pe rpe tua l . 4 The perpetual rates are 0 , 10, 20 , 30, 40 , and 
50 percent for mean annual cost saving responses of $0 , 
$10 , $ 2 0 , $30 , $40 , and $50 , respectively. 
The multivariate regression mode l , GDR = XB, where 
X is a matrix of explanatory variable observations and B is 
the vector of coefficients, can be estimated by OLS . How-
ever , O L S will yield biased est imators if there are many 
observations clustered at the limiting value of the dependent 
variable (a response of 50 percent) . This information can 
be applied to the estimation of the discount r a t e . 5 A tobit 
model is useful in dealing with such a truncated, dependent 
variable in multivariate regression analysis (Tobin 1958). 
Tob i t is a hybr id of probi t and mul t ip le regress ion . It 
yields answers to two questions in this study: (1) the prob-
ability of a participant responding that the stated payoffs 
were sufficient to warrant investment, and (2) the necessary 
discount rate to entice investment. In using this procedure, 
an index, /., is estimated which is linearly dependent upon 
a set of independen t var iab les . It = XA, where / is un-
bounded and A is a vector of normalized coefficients. Each 
observation of the dependent variable, GDRt, is a function 
of the same explanatory variable set, X, through the / vari-
able and a critical value of the index, / * . If the upper bound, 
/ * , is greater than /,., then GDRt is the difference between 
/, and the critical / * . 
The probability that GDR is less than the limit can be 
examined for any observation by using the standard normal 
cumulative distribution to transform /, into probabilit ies. 
The normalized coefficients in the model then can be trans-
fo rmed to regress ion coefficients b y mul t ip ly ing by the 
standard error of estimate. Hypothesis testing can be per-
formed using the asymptotic standard errors or likelihood 
ratio tests. 
Those households that answered " d o n ' t know or uncer-
t a i n " (approx imate ly one- th i rd of the sample) were ex-
cluded from the analysis of the discount rate level. Because 
the investment question allowed any level of positive sav-
ings to be indicated through a response of " $ 5 0 or m o r e , " 
the failure to make a positive response may indicate that 
the " d o n ' t know or uncer ta in" respondents were unable to 
formulate the problem sufficiently well to perceive an op-
por tun i ty . T h u s cost savings on the inves tment may be 
meaningless to them. Using a probit model , we examined 
the factors that affect the probability of a " d o n ' t k n o w " 
response . 
4Choosing a different investment life will slightly alter the discount 
rates, but the estimated coefficients do not appear sensitive. When a 20-
year life is used, very few differences emerge in regression results. 
5Regardless of the regression model used, the results are robust, pro-
viding similar regression coefficient values and levels of statistical signif-
icance for the explanatory variables. Another regression model that could 
be used, in lieu of tobit, is an extension of the dichotomous probit model 
which allows a categorical, discontinuous variable (see McKelvey and 
Zavoina 1975). 
The Empirical Model of the Discount Rate 
T h e consumer ' s choice of a m i n i m u m return on invest-
m e n t is empi r ica l ly e x a m i n e d wi th a d isaggregate tobit 
model : 
GDR = B0 + BXEXP + BJNT 
+ 
+ B3INC + B4HSF + B5NUM ( 1 ) 
+ B6DTY + BnDAG 
where: 
GDR = the gross , implicit discount rate, implicitly se-
lected by the r e s p o n d e n t th rough his or her 
choice of a m i n i m u m annual savings from the 
investment 
EXP - a variable of major household energy conser-
vation measures performed within the last 2 4 
months; 11 options were equally weighted in an 
index (see Appendix for details) 
INT = a variable of stated intentions to invest in en-
ergy conse rv ing m e a s u r e s in the coming 12 
months; 11 options were equally weighted in an 
index (see Appendix for details) 
INC = annual income for the household 
HSF = heated square footage of the household 
NUM = n u m b e r of ind iv idua l s l iv ing full-t ime in t h e 
household 
DTY = dummy variable for housing type (1 = mobile 
home; 0 = convent ional) 
DAG = dummy variable for housing construction date 
(1 = pre-1974; 0 = 1974 or newer) 
In estimating Equation 1, we seek to explain the rela-
t ionship between the level of the discount rate for the in-
ves tmen t and a set of e x p l a n a t o r y e c o n o m i c and d e m o -
graph ic var iab les . T h e e x p e c t e d s igns of the regress ion 
coefficients are displayed above the variables in the equa-
t ion. 
Testable Hypotheses 
The tobit model of the gross discount rate level (Equation 
1) provides the basis for a number of testable hypotheses. 
In general, to be consistent with economical ly rational b e -
hav io r , the mode l should s u p p o r t a pos i t ive re la t ionship 
between higher expected program costs to the investor and 
the required return on investment (indicated by GDR). A s 
d i scussed , many expec ted u s e r - b o r n e cos ts may be e x -
cluded from the explicit s tatements of costs and savings in 
the mail survey. Factors indicating higher program costs to 
a consumer (compared to others in the sample) should push 
up the individual 's discount ra te . Conversely , factors in-
dicating reduced relative expected program costs should 
reduce the discount rate necessary to make the investment 
w o r t h w h i l e . T h e v a r i a b l e s i n c l u d e d in E q u a t i o n 1 a r e 
briefly discussed in what fol lows. 
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1. Greater experience (EXP) and more planned actions 
for saving energy (INT) should negatively affect the dis-
count rate (GDR). T v e r s k y and K a h n e m a n (1973) and 
6 Lower income families also may tend to ignore the investment and 
respond ' 'don't know or uncertain." These responses are not included in 
the analysis of positive discount rates; they are examined in a following 
section. 
(1979) obse rves , as income and marginal tax rate r ise , some 
added savings accrue to the investor in consumer durables , 
reducing the needed return. 
The first t w o effects (suggesting a negative income-to-
GDR re la t ionship) may be countered by the incentive for 
higher i n c o m e families to increase work outside the home; 
this s ta tement p resumes that a higher income level is in-
d ica t ive of i n c r e a s e d l abor ea rn ing p o w e r . Subs t i tu t ion 
away from household production activities when real wages 
rise has been observed , among others, by Menefee (1982). 
The responden t s ' percept ions of the complementari ty of la-
bor input to the opera t ion of the device is unknown. If, in 
fact, the capi tal services from the investment are perceived 
as substitutes for labor , then additional implicit cost saving 
would occur , and the gross implicit discount rate would be 
affected negat ively . Al though there may b e some varying 
directions of inf luence, the overall effect of income on the 
discount ra te is predicted to be negat ive. 
3 . Greater household size, measured in square footage 
of heated dwelling space (HSF), should negatively affect 
the discount rate. Fo r househo ld square footage to di -
rectly reduce GDR, the respondent must expect cost savings 
(beyond the direct functioning of the device) from a larger 
household . Househo ld size, for example , may be posit ively 
correlated wi th heat ing and cooling system stocks and other 
energy-using capi ta l . If a respondent expects scale econ-
omies with respect to the energy-using household capital , 
then addit ional savings may be anticipated beyond those 
stated for the dev ice . 
However , househo ld size may be positively correlated 
with weal th . If greater wealth reduces the overall savings 
rate of consumers (see Ferber 1973), the HSF variable may 
be ac t ing , in pa r t , to r e d u c e inves tments in a h o u s e h o l d 
durable. Other l ines of causality could be presented. A spu-
rious c a u s e of a p o s i t i v e re la t ionship b e t w e e n HSF and 
GDR is due to the correlat ion of HSF with income. The 
s imple co r r e l a t i on b e t w e e n the t w o var iables is -f-0.46. 
Therefore, i ncome and household square footage effects 
may best be interpreted joint ly . 
Add i t i ona l d u m m y var iab les for mob i l e h o m e versus 
conventional home (DTY) and for older (pre-1974) homes 
(DAG) were included in the empirical model to control for 
variability due to structural differences in dwell ings. 
4 . As the number of household members (NUM) in-
creases, the required discount rate should increase. There 
are two influences to consider . First, as the number of in-
dividuals under one roof increases, the income available to 
each falls. The re is considerable evidence that lower per 
capita income leads to a decrease in the short-run savings-
to-consumption ratio (Ferber 1973). Assuming the average 
household m e m b e r ' s well-being is considered in spending 
decisions, as income falls, an increase in the required dis-
count rate on any given investment is expected. 
The second influence concerns the complementari ty or 
substitutability of household labor for the capital services 
Kahneman and Tversky (1972) have shown that as events 
become harder for an individual to picture, s/he will con-
sider the events less l ikely to occur. Thus , past experience 
with investment analysis for similar types of durables or 
the present, ongoing considerat ion of similar investments 
should make a c o n s u m e r more will ing to engage in analysis. 
Prior exper ience wi th similar investments may alter per-
ception of invest ing skil ls . For an investment in a technol-
ogy with many unclear or unstated attributes, a consumer ' s 
dependence on p r io r e x p e r i e n c e wi th inves tment goods 
sharing similar genera l characterist ics is hypothesized to 
reduce the e x p e c t e d cos t from imp lemen ta t ion of an in-
vestment p rogram. For example , the recent purchase and 
installation of insulat ion or a heating unit may increase a 
consumer ' s confidence that s/he can easily incorporate more 
improvements into the household . 
Where intentions to engage in planned energy-saving ac-
tivities are s t rong, there may be expected cost savings as-
socia ted wi th i m p l e m e n t i n g and m a n a g i n g a n u m b e r of 
c o m p l e m e n t a r y i n v e s t m e n t s . Wi th m a n y s imi lar invest -
ments expected, a consumer is likely to view the costs of 
adding another as low; an investment in learning how to 
u s e such durables has already been " s u n k . " The intention 
variable also may be posit ively correlated with consumer 
attitudes favoring conservat ion as a desired end in itself. If 
s o , a consumer responding with high numbers for the INT 
var iab le w o u l d r e q u i r e a smal le r m o n e t a r y payback . It 
should be emphas ized , however , that the intentions variable 
is not an at tempt to directly measure atti tudes. 
Because the t w o v a r i a b l e s , EXP and INT, are indices 
formed as equally weigh ted summations of 11 different pos-
sible conservat ion ac t ions , the reliability of both indices 
should be examined . A n internal consistency procedure, the 
Cronbach alpha coefficient, was employed to examine re-
liability. The coefficients for EXP and INT were 0 .65 and 
0 . 6 8 , respectively. Whi l e there is no statistical test for ac-
ceptance or rejection of the value , alpha values of this size 
g i v e some degree of confidence that the indices are reliable 
(Nunnal ly 1978, p p . 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 ) . 
2 . Higher household income (INC) should negatively 
affect the discount rate. There are several effects of in-
c o m e upon the d i scount rate level . First , income may be 
pos i t i ve ly co r r e l a t ed wi th educa t iona l leve l . Ind iv idua ls 
w i t h more educat ion m a y be more capable of understanding 
t h e investment p roposa l than those with less education. If 
l ow- income families recognize a high probability of their 
m a k i n g large errors , then they rationally choose high rates 
of return to compensa t e for the r i sk . 6 Second, as Hausman 
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of the proposed investment. Labor complementari ty sug-
gests a downward revision in the stated cost savings from 
the device . However , if the new capital is expected to be 
a substitute for some household labor, then the cost savings 
may be enhanced. The true relationship is not clear. An-
other problem of inferring expected labor cost for the num-
ber of individuals in the household is the unknown quality 
of the l abor . Fo r e x a m p l e , small ch i ldren may be unac -
ceptable " w o r k e r s . " On balance, the per capita income 
effect is expected to be larger than any effects of labor in 
household product ion, and the expected sign of NUM is 
posi t ive. 
T o summarize , the expected effects of explanatory vari-
ables upon the household ' s selection of a discount rate are: 
• Greater income or greater household square footage is ex-
pected to reduce an individual household's discount rate. 
Because of collinearity between these two explanatory 
variables, individual effects on GDR may be obscured and 
only a joint interpretation of effect may be reasonable. 
• Both experience with energy-conserving activities and in-
tentions to engage in such activities are hypothesized to 
reduce the discount rate. 
• More household members are expected to increase the dis-
count rate. 
Re la t ionsh ips be tween explanatory var iables and the 
level of the discount rate (dependent variable) can be in-
terpreted as follows: 
• The higher the discount rate, the less likely that a similar 
real investment will be undertaken. 
• Thus any variable that positively (negatively) affects the 
discount rate will reduce (increase) the likelihood of a 
household undertaking energy-conserving investments. 
Results of the Discount Rate Estimation 
Because the cost saving response is t runca ted ($50 or 
more) , a tobit model was used in estimating the discount 
rate with the limiting value of the discount rate at 50 per-
cent. At the mean of continuous variables and modal values 
of the dummies , the probability of a nonlimit observation 
(positive return less than 50 percent) is 87 .9 percent; the 
observed frequency is 87.7 percent. Table 1 shows the nor-
malized coefficients, r-ratios, estimated regression coeffi-
cients , and the elasticities at the means of continuous vari-
ables. The regression coefficients and elasticities apply to 
the relationship between the explanatory variables and the 
level of the gross discount rate, given that GDR is a non-
limit observation. Summary statistics for the explanatory 
variables are shown in Table 2 (left co lumns) , and the sim-
ple correlation coefficient matrix is shown in the upper sec-
tion of Table 3 . 
Changes in the level of the discount rate are most sen-
sitive to the household square footage (HSF). Also impor-
tant in terms of the percentage change in the discount rate 
level r e su l t ing from a percent c h a n g e in an exp lana to ry 
variable (elasticity) are number of family members (NUM) 
and intentions to conserve (INT): 
TABLE 1 
RESULTS OF TOBIT ANALYSIS3 
Normalized Regression Elas-
Variable name coefficient T-ratio coefficient ticityb 
Housing type (DTY)C 
Housing age (DAG)d 
0.20427 1.56 3.8824e 
-0.24192 -2.92 -4.5981' 
Number (NUM) 0.07601 2.65 1.4447' + .197 
Experience (EXP) -0.00841 -0.42 -0.1559 
Income (INC) -0.00001 -0.98 -0.0001 
Intentions (INT) -0.08133 2.66 -1.5459' -.059 
Home size (HSF) -0.00019 3.47 -0.0037' -.227 
Constant 1.6242 10.29 30.870' 
R2 .0563 
aGiven nonlimit observation; upper limit response = 50 percent. Dependent variable 
= gross, implicit discount rate. 
Elasticities calculated at mean values (percentage change in size of discount rate for 
small percentage change in explanatory variable, given nonlimit observation). 
cDummy variable for housing type (1 = mobile home; 0 = conventional). 
dDummy variable for housing age (1 = pre-1974; 0 = 1974 or newer). 
Significant for 1 9 0 (statistical tests are based on asymptotic properties of normalized 
coefficients). 
'Significant for 1 9 9 . 
Elasticity 
Household square footage — .227 
Number in family + .197 
Intentions to conserve — .059 
Al though these t h r ee va r i ab le s act in accord with the 
hypotheses , income, surprisingly, does not. The coefficient 
is negative but insignificant. There are a number of possible 
explanations for the result . First , the high correlation be-
t w e e n i n c o m e and h o u s e h o l d squa re f o o t a g e ( + 0.46) 
m a k e s it difficult to in terpre t the two var iab les indepen-
dently. Thus , the testing of independent effects on the dis-
count rate from each of these variables may not be mean-
ingful. Second, it may be that the various counterbalancing 
influences of the i n c o m e var iab le p rev ious ly discussed 
weakens the l inkage to the discount rate. Last , the overall 
magnitude of the effect of income on the discount rate may 
be slight, making findings of statistical significance difficult 
to obtain. Interestingly, the role of income is greatly ex-
panded in explaining the choice of a " d o n ' t know or un-
cer ta in" response, suggest ing that at this more elementary 
level of choice, income plays a different role. This is dis-
cussed in the following section. 
For energy-saving durab les , a dampening influence on 
investment may result from a trend decline in the size of 
housing units . For example , the construction of smaller new 
h o m e s may lead to a dec l ine in the accep tance of new 
energy-saving investments . A countering effect may be a 
decline in the average family s ize—a trend which would 
act to lower the requi red d i scount rate and increase the 
probability of investment. 
Although household size and number in the family are 
important variables, the intentions to engage in conserving 
activities (INT) may have a more important short-term in-
fluence on energy-saving investments . Household square 
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TABLE 2 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES 
Positive savings responses only "Don't know or uncertain" responses 
(725 observations) (356 observations) 
Variable name Mean 
Standard 
deviation Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Housing type (DTY)a 
Housing age (DAG)b 
Number (NUM) 
Experience (EXP) 
Income (INC) 
Intentions (INT) 
Home size (HSF) 
0.10897 
0.67724 
3.2938 
1.9117 
19,612. 
0.92690 
1,485.7 
0.31181 
0.46785 
1.3748 
1.9032 
9,863. 
1.2411 
801.82 
0.17697 
0.80337 
3.0758 
1.5112 
12,969. 
.5787 
1,032.2 
0.38218 
0.39801 
1.5771 
1.8877 
8,781. 
1.0546 
752.18 
aDummy variable for housing type (1 
bDummy variable for housing age (1 
= mobile home; 0 = conventional). 
= pre-1974;0 = 1974 or newer). 
f o o t a g e , i n c o m e , a n d n u m b e r of f ami ly m e m b e r s are 
" s t o c k " va r i ab les 7 and generally change quite slowly. On 
the other hand , large percentage changes in the intentions 
index are not improbable when the current level of inten-
t ions is low. For e x a m p l e , when the current intentions index 
is at 1 (activity), an increase by jus t 1 in intended activities 
wou ld decrease the est imated discount rate from 22 .2 to 
2 0 . 9 percent in our mode l . To obtain a like change in the 
discount rate, mean family size would have to rise from 
3 . 2 9 to 4 . 2 7 m e m b e r s . B e c a u s e i n c o m e and househo ld 
square footage are highly correlated, an individual variable 
interpretation m a y be improper . If considered joint ly , in-
c o m e and household square footage still must rise far above 
normal trend to have the impact of a 1-unit increase in the 
intentions index . Promot ing the concept of energy-conserv-
ing activities m a y be one way of altering the intentions of 
consumers to per form these activities. Thus successful pro-
mot ions that substantial ly increase intentions should have 
a large influence on the actual acceptance rate of untr ied, 
energy-saving durable goods . 
T h e hypothesized negat ive effect of the experience vari-
a b l e on the d iscount rate was not observed to be statistically 
significant. Exper ience and intentions are not necessarily 
pos i t i ve ly l inked ; each m a y p lay a different ro le in the 
m o d e l . The s imple correlat ion coefficient in this sample is 
+ O.008 . C o r r e l a t i on cou ld be nega t ive if, for e x a m p l e , 
t h e r e were a major revision in consumer plans . The role of 
exper ience in provid ing assurance to an individual that s/he 
h a s some basic competency in an investment area may be 
impor tant in expla in ing the decision to examine an invest-
m e n t proposal on economic grounds . That subject is dis-
cus sed in ' the next sect ion. 
Whether hous ing is mobi le h o m e or conventional (DTY) 
is statistically significant at the 90-percent confidence in-
t e r v a l . The p o s i t i v e s ign of DTY m a y b e inf luenced by 
collinearity with household square footage (HSF). The sim-
7Income may be considered as a stock (of wealth) if it is interpreted as 
a proxy for permanent income. 
pie correlation coefficient of HSF to DTY is —0.325 . Sur-
prisingly, DAG, the d u m m y on hous ing age (1 = pre-1974 
construction), had a negat ive effect on the discount rate . 
An explanation of this result is not obvious . One line of 
r eason ing is tha t o l d e r h o u s i n g uni t s are on ave rage in 
poorer repair so that the probabi l i ty of an energy-saving 
device achieving c la imed results may be considered high. 
The mean observed discount rate of 22.5 percent is not 
unusually high for an inves tment in household durables . 
Hausman (1979) , in a study of consumer purchases of en-
ergy-saving appl iances , found a 2 6 . 4 percent mean level of 
the discount ra te . He est imated much higher rates for low 
income levels and m u c h lower rates for very high income 
levels. By contrast , ou r results do not suggest this l inkage 
of the discount rate level to i ncome . The discount ra tes , 
calculated by income ranges , are: 
Annual 
income range Discount rate 
Under $5,000 21.6% 
$5,000-$ 10,000 25.4% 
$10,001-$15,000 25.3% 
$15,001-$25,000 23.0% 
Over $25,000 19.9% 
These results suggest that , once a consumer is wil l ing to 
consider an inves tment in te rms of expected costs and ben-
efits, income m a y play a weak role in predicting the dis-
count rate level and the consequent acceptance rate. In the 
next section, w e examine the role of income in the decision 
not to attempt an economic appraisal of the investment . 
The "Don't Know or Uncertain" Response 
Here we look briefly at the factors that may push a house-
hold r e sponden t in to t he " d o n ' t k n o w or u n c e r t a i n " re -
sponse on the inves tment ques t ion . W e have argued pre-
v ious ly that th is r e s p o n s e i s , in gene ra l , m a d e wi thou t 
consideration of either future costs or values surrounding 
the durable. A decis ion made wi thout examining costs or 
benefits cannot b e cons idered as rational investment anal-
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TABLE 3 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT MATRICES 
A. Positive return respondents: 
Variable 
DTY 1.00000 
DAG -0.00475 1.00000 
NUM -0.05867 -0.05208 1.00000 
EXP -0.07920 -0.07548 0.08119 
INC -0.23658 -0.14029 0.19194 
INT -0.04720 0.04970 0.10084 
HSF -0.32477 -0.15728 0.21622 
VAR DTY DAG NUM 
"Don't know or uncertain" respondents: 
Variable 
DTY 1.00000 
DAG 0.00718 1.00000 
NUM -0.07374 -0.13324 1.00000 
EXP -0.15700 -0.12828 0.09765 
INC -0.16050 -0.09785 0.27892 
INT -0.08006 -0.07043 0.18017 
HSF -0.21721 -0.17657 0.15246 
VAR DTY DAG NUM 
1.00000 
0.00341 1.00000 
0.00837 0.07655 1.00000 
0.02379 0.45788 0.01756 1.00000 
EXP INC INT HSF 
1.00000 
0.09261 1.00000 
0.22879 0.16453 1.00000 
0.12702 0.36634 0.11127 1.00000 
EXP INC INT HSF 
ys is . This assertion rests upon the opt ion not chosen by the 
' ' d o n ' t k n o w " r e s p o n d e n t s — i . e . , to ind ica te the open-
ended highest return on the investment; some positive return 
m u s t be sufficient to induce i nves tmen t for any ra t ional 
individual . 
The s a m e set of explanatory variables from Equation 1 
is used in a probit regression, where 1 . = " d o n ' t know or 
u n c e r t a i n " r e sponse . Tab le 2 , in the far r ight c o l u m n s , 
indicates means and standard deviations of each explanatory 
variable for the " d o n ' t k n o w " respondents , and Table 3 
shows the simple correlation coefficient matr ix . The regres-
sion coefficient estimates and r-ratios are: 
Variable Estimate T-ratio 
DTY - . 0 6 1 9 4 - 0 . 4 9 9 
DAG .20775 2.110 
NUM - .03736 1.269 
EXP - .04239 - 1 . 8 8 3 
INC - . 0 0 0 0 3 - 6 . 7 3 3 
INT - . 1 1 3 3 0 - 3 . 0 3 9 
HSF - . 0 0 0 2 6 - 4 . 1 1 7 
Constant .34647 2.139 
R 2 = .1440 
The largest difference between the probit model and the 
mode l of the discount rate level is the greater magni tude of 
the i ncome effect in the probit analysis . In addit ion, ex-
per ience is a statistically significant var iable in the probit 
mode l . Al l other variables that were significant in the tobit 
analysis of the level of the discount rate remain so , and the 
s ize of the household square footage var iable effect is in-
creased . A s discussed previously, consumers with low in-
c o m e s m a y lack the tools to grasp the inves tment problem. 
T h u s income may act as a " f i l t e r , " pushing such individ-
uals into a " d o n ' t k n o w " nonresponse . The relationship 
b e t w e e n i n c o m e level and the p robab i l i ty of the " d o n ' t 
k n o w , " nonrat ional response is: 
Probability of "don ' t know 
Income level or uncertain" response 
$5,000 42.0% 
$10,000 35.3% 
$15,000 29.2% 
$20,000 23.4% 
$25,000 18.5% 
$35,000 10.7% 
High posi t ive correlation be tween income and household 
s q u a r e foo tage sugges t s the s a m e w a r n i n g as before— 
n a m e l y , that the two variables may best be treated jointly. 
T h e magn i tude of the combined effect of these two vari-
ables , m o v i n g in unison, should approximate the effects 
demons t ra ted in the tabular display jus t g iven . 
G r e a t e r e x p e r i e n c e wi th e n e r g y - c o n s e r v i n g activities 
tends to increase the probabil i ty that a posi t ive savings re-
sponse will b e obtained from an individual . T h e fact that 
the exper ience variable (like income) is significant at this 
level of analysis but is not significant in the regression on 
the discount rate level is consistent with the following ar-
gument : (1) individuals ' conceptual abilities are linked to 
prior exper ience as well as to income; (2) once this con-
c e p t u a l p r o b l e m is o v e r c o m e , t h e i n v e s t m e n t analysis 
h inges upon expected future benefits and cos ts , which are 
essential ly unrelated to income or prior exper ience . While 
this l ine of reasoning has plausibi l i ty, there may be other 
a rguments that could be offered. 
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Unexplained Variance 
The low R2 v a lue s f r o m t h e e s t ima t ions sugges t s tha t 
these basic mode ls may b e w e a k in a number of ways . T o 
obtain a measure of p red i c t i ve va l id i ty , cross-validated cor-
relations were obta ined o n t h e probi t mode l . This was d o n e 
by splitting the sample r a n d o m l y into an est imation and a 
holdout sample . Regres s ion pa rame te r s from the es t imat ion 
sample were used to o b t a i n predic t ions of the dependent 
var iable in the h o l d o u t s a m p l e . T h e cor re la t ion of t he se 
predictions with the ac tua l h o l d o u t values of the dependent 
variable was m a d e . Th i s p r o c e d u r e was then reversed, with 
the holdout sample b e c o m i n g the est imation sample . Fo r 
the overall sample e s t ima t ion , the unadjusted R2 is 0 . 1 4 4 . 
The two cross-val idat ion cor re la t ions are 0 .151 and 0 . 1 3 4 . 
The low R2 values r e p o r t e d for the estimated mode ls do 
not signal the fai lure o f t h e m o d e l s . Par t of the l o w ex-
plained variance in the ana ly s i s of the discount rate level 
may result from r a n d o m n e s s of response by those w h o had 
no rational basis for c h o i c e . Undoub ted ly , our models con-
tain insufficient in format ion to explain the initial responses 
to a tough investment d e c i s i o n . Personali ty character is t ics , 
attitudes, and family life s t y l e — a s well as addit ional eco-
nomic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s — m a y b e qu i t e impor t an t . S tud ie s 
wi th more specific a n d e x t e n s i v e data on these fac tors 
should throw m o r e l ight on t he influences behind decis ions 
about investments in un t r i ed durab les . However , it is l ikely 
that low R2 va lues w o u l d b e obta ined with a much r icher 
data set. Quest ions that p r o v i d e very little detailed infor-
mation about a long- t e rm act iv i ty and that require substan-
tial conceptual and ana ly t i c abil i ty will invariably puzzle 
p rospec t ive d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s . O u r m o d e l only p r o v i d e s 
c lues to s o m e of the r e l e v a n t fac tors beh ind i nves tmen t 
behavior. 
SUMMARY 
In a mail survey, h o u s e h o l d s were asked to choose either 
the minimal acceptable annua l cost reduction on a long-
lived energy-saving d e v i c e (g iven an initial purchase and 
installation price) or to c h o o s e not to respond by indicating 
" d o n ' t know or u n c e r t a i n . " W e then sought to examine 
factors influencing the c h o i c e s of households . 
Factors related to e x p e c t e d cost and value influence the 
decisions of individuals w h o can conceptualize an invest-
ment problem. Gene ra l ly , c o n s u m e r s acted as if there were 
additional costs beyond t h o s e stated in the survey quest ion, 
and they consistently a t t e m p t e d to integrate the incremental 
costs into their inves tment dec i s ions . In the study, this was 
reflected by lower ind iv idua l discount rates for those bear-
ing lower expected cos t s (or greater value) for the invest-
ment . 
Factors that lower the d i scount rate increase the rate of 
acceptance of an untried du rab le good. Variables important 
to explaining the d i scount ra te are: household square foot-
age , number of family m e m b e r s , age of housing, and in-
tentions to under take ene rgy-conse rv ing activities. A major 
short-term decrease in t h e d i scoun t rate and increase in the 
acceptance rate for an investment is unlikely unless inten-
t ions are substantially revised upward. Unlike other vari-
ables in the model (such as income, family s ize , and house-
hold square footage) , intentions are subject to larger and 
quicker adjustments that can rapidly alter the prospects for 
investment . 
For individuals w h o do not have the conceptual tools to 
analyze the investment problem, a response to the invest-
m e n t q u e s t i o n i s , in gene ra l , nonra t iona l (made wi thout 
considerat ion of costs or benefits). The bulk of these indi-
viduals responded to the question with a " d o n ' t know or 
u n c e r t a i n " response . Compared to those w h o went ahead 
and answered the investment question, the " d o n ' t k n o w " 
respondents were characterized by lower income, smaller 
h o m e s , larger families, less experience with energy-con-
serving activit ies, and lower intentions to engage in future 
energy-conserv ing activities. 
The s tudy did not find that consumers who participated 
in the survey by providing positive return responses were 
behaving irrationally. Although income was an important 
variable in predict ing whether an individual would consider 
the inves tment analysis , it played no statistically significant 
ro le in exp l a in ing the level of the d i scount ra te used b y 
individuals . The mean discount rate observed in the study 
was 22 .5 percent and does not vary significantly with in-
c o m e . This finding contrasts with earlier work by Hausman 
(1979) , which found very high discount rates used by the 
poor . 
[Received June 1982. Revised June 1983.] 
APPENDIX 
T h e ind ices of e x p e r i e n c e , EXP, and i n t en t i ons , INT, 
were developed from each respondent ' s answers to the fol-
lowing quest ion: 
Check below those things which you or your landlord have 
done in the last twenty-four months (two years), if any, AND 
those which you or your landlord are definitely planning to 
do in the next twelve months, if any. Check ALL that apply. 
Individuals were given 10 specific options of things they 
m a y have d o n e or in tended to do . Fo r e a c h , they cou ld 
check " h a v e done in the last 24 m o n t h s , " "defini tely plan-
n ing to do in the nex t 12 m o n t h s , " or b o t h . T h e la t te r 
would be the appropriate response, for example , if the re-
spondent had recently added ceiling insulation and intended 
to increase the thickness within the year. T h e 10 specific 
options were : 
1. Add ceiling insulation 
2. Add wall or floor insulation 
3. Put insulation around a water heater 
4. Install a clock thermostat 
5. Purchase storm or insulated windows or doors 
6. Adjust the usual temperature setting, either up 
in the summer or down in the winter 
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7. Add attic or roof fans 
8. Install an auxiliary heating unit using coal or wood 
9. Add weather stripping or caulking around doors, 
windows, walls, or foundations 
10. Purchase a more energy-efficient heating unit, air 
conditioner, or hot-water heater 
An eleventh option was " o t h e r major energy conservation 
efforts (please spec i fy ) , " and several blank lines followed 
for a response . Based on the number of checked responses 
out of a m a x i m u m of 11 for either past or intended action, 
the indices EXP and INT were developed. Thus , for ex-
a m p l e , INT = 3 w o u l d state that th ree of the poss ib le 
actions listed were planned for the coming year. 
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